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1. Introduction 
Considering the demographic structure of the northern and southern shores of the 
Mediterranean several complementary patterns can be easily defined. The states that extend 
along the south are, as noted, characterised by a substantial concentration of youthful 
populations, with over 30% of the population under fifteen years of age.  In the north instead 
the societies are distinguishable for the ageing process under way, with over 18% of the 
population above 65 years of age.  Equally, in Europe annual birth rates are close to the 
substitution rate, while along the African-Asian coast the rate reaches 3.9% in some areas, as 
for example in the Gaza Strip1. 
Containment of this demographic spurt constitutes a priority for the area’s various 
governments: Egypt, Iran and Turkey have begun programmes aimed at curbing births, 
supported by UN programmes2. Syria and Jordan have not expressly adopted such policies.  
But slowing growth is not always the goal of national population policies.  Even in the high-
growth Middle East two governments actually encourage large families, those of Saudi Arabia 
and Israel3. 
As is known, one of the principal declared objectives of Zionism is to make the Jewish 
people into a nation like many others. The impossibility of transforming, for well-known 
reasons, emergency policies into a routine has increased the weight of the demographic 
question such that often the geographic dimension of the conflict is pushed into the 
background, especially in the recurring debates amongst the Israeli people.  The Israeli interest 
in the future size, composition and age structure of the population has increased in recent 
years due to the large number of immigrants – arriving primarily from the former USSR. This 
interest stems from the need for economic and social policies adapted to the needs of a 
quickly-growing and fast-changing population. Projections present potential developments in 
the size, composition and structure of Israel’s population, based on developments in fertility, 
mortality and migration patterns. 
The state of Israel has been defined as a Western country that at the same time presents 
characteristics typical of a developing society4. One of these aspects is of course demography, 
which remains more similar to those countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean, 
even excluding the birth rates of the Orthodox communities. The demographic question 
remains one of the more difficult aspects of defining a scenario of peaceful co-existence 
between Israel, a future Palestinian entity, and other Arab governments. A framework 
summarising the entire problem can be drawn up with just a few statistics. 
                                                 
1  Yet these very high rates of growth are not evenly distributed across the region.  The three largest 
countries, Turkey, Iran and Egypt, comprising almost 75% of its inhabitants, have relatively slow 
growth.  Turkey’s population of 68 million is growing at 1.9%.  These rates of natural growth are much 
higher than in Europe (Germany is at 0.4%, Italy 0.1%, France 0.4%, whilst the United States is at 0.9%) 
but far lower than elsewhere in the Middle East.  The annual natural growth rate in Syria is 2.5%, in 
Jordan 2.8%, in Iraq 2.8%, in Saudi Arabia 3.3%. Data Country Report, 2003. 
2  The Iranian government has established birth control offices throughout the country, and sends 
hundreds of mobile centres to rural areas. In cooperation with international organisations, Egypt has 
undertaken a three-year plan to lower the natural growth rate, and before that, President Mubarak was 
making the case to Egyptians that to safeguard their children’s opportunities for education and health, 
parents had to take their income into account when planning their families. Courbage, 1999. 
3  In addition to subsidies for large families, both governments reward the parents of numerous children. 
4  This affirmation has been attributed to Itzhak Ravid, a retired military analyst and former head of the 
Branch for Operations Research of the Israeli Air Force. Ravid was director of the national security team 
under prime ministers Yitzhak Shamir and Yitzhak Rabin in 1992-1993. On this question see Berkowitz, 
2004. 
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Ethnic and cultural factors are obviously decisive in understanding the main dynamics. 
Among Arab Israelis of the Muslim faith, the natural growth rate is 3.5%, equal to that of 
Saudi Arabia.  Within the Arab Israeli component, the annual birth rate for Christians is 
around 1.4%. On the other hand, the relative increase of the Jewish Israeli population, 
excluding those of the Orthodox community, is 1%. Finally, the ultra-Orthodox Jewish Israelis 
demonstrate a growth rate of 3.5%. If subsidies and rewards for more prolific families exclude 
more or less 70% of the Jewish population, these policies help, indirectly, the Muslim Arab 
minority. 
The greatest worry for Israeli authorities, obviously, emerges from the realisation that the 
demographic increase of the Arab population demonstrates rates that are higher on average 
Jewish rates, notwithstanding migratory flows favourable to the Jewish community that have 
been experienced various times over the last fifty years, and the reduction of persons 
belonging to the youngest Palestinian generation as well as the exoduses of 1948 and 1967. 
The demographic projections lend themselves to significant exploitation and various 
important aspects are not yet considered adequately. The most likely scenario, as well as the 
one most commonly accepted within the academic world predicts that the next twenty-five 
years will see a stabilisation of Jewish birth rates and a gradual reduction in Palestinian rates. 
These conclusions find their own logic in Jewish and Arab birth rates which, from 1990 
on, have remained constant notwithstanding natural increases in the Palestinian Israeli 
community that continue to be higher, as indicated in Table 1.  
If these conditions should persist, within twenty years the Palestinian population, currently 
living in Israel, should grow and reach 28% of the total5, posing a series of not-minor 
problems, especially in an electoral context. 
The demographic policies of the government in Jerusalem must in addition take into 
account a series of internal dynamics that impede the development of clear demographic 
strategies. The age pyramid of Israeli society indicates a concentration of individuals under 25 
years of age at over 36% of the total population, as well as average life expectancy rates6 and a 
territorial distribution of the population, with significant percentages of residents in urban 
centres and a limited number engaged in the agricultural sector, comparable to that of 
countries along the opposite shore of the Mediterranean.  The political priorities for the Israeli 
state, which considering the precarious nature of Middle Eastern geopolitical equilibriums, 
require remaining linked to the more advanced capitalist countries, can not refuse to guarantee 
a competitive school system for the younger generation and the maintenance of advanced 
services for the rest of the population. 
The demographic policies of the government in Jerusalem must in addition take into 
account a series of internal dynamics that impede the development of clear demographic 
strategies. The age pyramid of Israeli society indicates a concentration of individuals under 25  
The entire question has been highly politicised, and suggest economic consequences that 
are hardly minor.  Israel’s per capita income remains some 30% below the average for 
European countries. One reason that explains this discrepancy can be detected in the 
significant category of the population that is voluntarily inactive, identifiable primarily with 
women belonging to the ultra-orthodox Jewish world, and the Muslim world in general, as 
well as to those ultra-orthodox men that often dedicate long years to religious studies. In other 
terms, if 75% of the population of Israel demonstrates productivity rates comparable to those 
of western countries, some 25% has rates more similar to those of the developing world.  
                                                 
5  Jewish birth rates in the period considered were higher amongst Eastern Jews, 3.14% in 1980 and 
3.09% in 1996, intermediate amongst Western Jews, 2.1% in 1996 and lower amongst the immigrants 
from the former Soviet Union, 1.69%. Those relative to Palestinian Arabs should take into account 
several territorial peculiarities. In the northern areas, from Netanaya to the Lebanese border, for example, 
in seven districts that extend over about 5,100 square kilometres, the Palestinians constitute 36% of the 
regional population, with peaks that arrive at 63% in Acco.  The demographic discussion concerning 
Israel does not take into account undermining effects that sudden political changes might cause in birth 
rate tendencies.  For example, between 1987 and 1993, due to the Intifada, in Gaza the birth rate 
increased to 6.23%. On this question we refer the reader to Courbage, 1999, pp.  62-81. 
6  Life expectancy rates of Israeli citizens amount to an average of 79 years.  These criteria are however 
only approximate. The data does not reflect the high mobility, the fact that many spend part of their lives 
abroad, and they exclude deaths due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Data CBS, (Central Bureau of 
Statistic of Israel), 2003.  
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Tab. n. 1. Sources of Population Growth. Thousands, unless otherwise stated 
TOTAL POPULATION 
% of migration 
balance out of 
total growth (1) 
% 
Annual 
growth 
Population at 
the end of the 
period 
Population at the 
beginning of the 
period 
Total Growth Period 
40,5 3,9 6.748,4 5.904,2 805,6 1948-2003 
64,6 8.2 2150,4 1.344,8 805,6 1948-1960 
37,8 (2) 3,2 (3) 3.220,7 (2) 901,8 2.150,6 1961-1971 
19.6 (2) 2,4 (3) 4.063,6 (2) 936,2 (5) 3.115,6 1972-1982 
5,9 1,8 4.559,6 525,9 (5) 4.033,7 1983-1989 
56,6 3,5 (4) 5.619,0 1.059,4 4.559,7 1990-1995 
39,1 1,9 6.369,0 757,6 (5) 5.612,6 1996-2000 
34,5 2,4 6.041,4 141,5 5.900,0 1998 
38,5 2,6 6.369,3 160,1 6.209,1 2000 
17,6 1,9 6.631,8 122,.3 6.508,8 2002 
-- 1,8 6.748,4 117,3 6.631,1 2003 
 
POPULATION GROUP 
Jewsh and others (6) 
59,0 2,4 5.180,8 347,8 4.067,4 1996-2000 
0,2 1,7 5.445,8 109,8 5.180,6 2001-2000 
45,7 2,2 4.936,7 105,5 4.830,5 1998 
54,8 2,6 5.065,2 129,2 4.936,2 1999 
46,9 2,3 5.180,6 115,4 5.065,2 2000 
25,9 1,6 5.367,2 85,9 5.281,9 2002 
13,6 1,5 5.446,7 79,6 5.367,2 2003 
 
Arab population 
5.4 3,4 1.188,7 183,5 1.004,9 1996-2000 
0,2 3,1 1.301,6 112,9 1.187,9 2001-2003 
1,6 3,4 1.105,6 36,0 1.069,4 1998 
6,0 3,5 1.143,9 38,4 1.105,4 1999 
16,3 3,0 1.188,7 44,8 1.143,9 2000 
-2,1 3,3 1.263,9 36,4 1.227,5 2002 
-0,3 3,0 1.301,6 37,7 1263,9 2003 
 
 
1. Until 1995, the balance of changes and corrections of religion were included in the migration balance, 
as of 1996 these balances are included in the total growth. 
2. Excluding the addition of the Arab population in East Jerusalem in 1967 and in the Golan Sub-
District in 1982. 
3. Includes census adjustments. The Arab population comprises the addition of Arabs in East Jerusalem 
and the Golan. 
4. Based on the 1993 Census. 
5. Discontinuity  due to census results. 
6. “Jews and others” includes Jews, other Christians (non-Arabs) and those not classified by religion. 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Population, Table 2.2. 
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Tab. n. 2. Live births, by population group (1). Rates per 1000. 
TOTAL JEWS ARAB AND OTHERS YEAR 
21.3 18.3 35.0 1996 
21.4 18.5 34.4 1997 
21.8 18.7 35.6 1998 
21.5 18.5 35.0 1999 
21.7 18.7 35.0 2000 
21.2 18.2 34.3 2001 
21.1 18.4 32.8 2002 
(1) Annual rates for the average population. 
Source: Central Bureau Statistic of Israel, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Population, Tab. C/1. 
 
The organs of the Israeli government, at least officially, prefer not speak of the 
demographic problem in their country, even if the topic is frequently addressed in the 
mainstream mass media.   
The frequency of demographic campaigns and the existence of legislation favouring more 
numerous families has sparked criticism from that part of Israeli civil society that views itself 
as closer to the West, being still in the majority, and considers these practices as incompatible 
with the concept of a democratic and modern state. The principal challenge for the 
government in Jerusalem is to maintain the majority Jewish component and extend rights to 
the growing Arab minority, which has complained of important discrimination in this regard7. 
This policy change is not merely an aspiration. In 2003, Netanyahu initiated a reform that 
severely cut Israeli’s child allowances beginning with the fifth child. Interestingly, these cuts 
would not have been possible but for a courageous decision taken early in 2001 by the newly-
elected Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. By forging a centre-right coalition government not 
dependent on the ultra-orthodox parties (and consequently no longer able to call on them in 
times of trouble), Sharon broke the decades-old, ultra-orthodox veto on social policy.  
 
Tab. n. 3. Principal geo-demographic characteristics in Israel 
YEAR 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Population Density 
(People per sq Km) -- 144 188 226 302 
Urban Population Growth 
(% of total) 5,3 4,1 2,8 3,2 2,18 
Rural Population Growth 
(% of total) 23 15,8 11,4 9,7 8,80 
Source: UC Atlas of Global Inequality. (ucatlas.ucsc.edu/country/99/population) 
 
                                                 
7  In December 2003, the Israeli Finance Minister Netanyahu, participated in the Herzliya Conference on 
national security. This was one of the rare episodes in which a high-level politician offered a declaration 
on the region’s demographic question. Even though his words summed up the dimensions of problem 
rather well, Netanyahu denied that the problem was the direct competence of Israeli authorities: “We 
have no interest in governing the Palestinians and the demographic problem will not exist in the 
territories when the population will be governed by Palestinian law… within Israel instead, the terms of 
different… if the Arab population were to reach 35-40% of the total population and become perfectly 
integrated, that the Jewish state would cease to exist and would evolve into a bi-national state. If instead 
the Palestinian component remains, as it is today, around 20%, our relations will remain tense and 
violent, and this could conflict with the democratic character of our society… It is necessary above all to 
guarantee a Jewish majority within the state… I say this as a secular politician, a democrat and a Zionist 
patriot…” On this topic see Berkowitz, 2004. 
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Whether his government’s reform will prove sufficient to cut the Gordian knot of Israeli’s 
demographic problem is far from clear: the problem is not only one of numbers, but also of the 
quality of relations between citizens. 
The intention of the Likud government was probably to re-vitalise the migratory flows into 
Israel8, considering that less than 36% of the presumed Jewish population worldwide lives 
inside Israel at the moment9. Nevertheless, not even from this strategy do we detect a 
combination of premises coherent enough to define a new course in Israeli demographic 
policy. In fact, the most recent immigration trends indicate the seriousness of the problem 
relative to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the insufficient nature of the initiatives adopted so far 
to resolve the situation. 
2. Migratory flows 
Migratory flows in Israel have been linked to specific events in international politics 
during the second postwar period. The most significant exoduses, as is noted, were those 
immediately after the Second World War in the wake of the emotional shock provoked by the 
Holocaust, following the first Arab-Israeli war and favoured by the Law of Return, passed in 
1951 by the Israeli government, which granted citizenship to anyone who could demonstrate 
Jewish relatives. Later, after the Suez Canal war in 1956, there was the expulsion of Sephardi 
Jews from the Arab countries. The last great migratory event occurred during the 1990’s, after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, when almost 750,000 persons left the former Soviet 
republics for Israel. 
These successive waves all had ethnic and cultural characteristics that were rather evident, 
and had a decisive influence on the concentration and territorial segregation of the population, 
as well as on the economic structure and electoral geography of the new Israeli state. As far as 
the recent Russian migration is concerned, it has not yet been possible to determine its overall 
effects, due to successive departures, to several naturalisation practices still under way, and to 
the conversion of many new arrivals to Christianity10. We might believe however that the 
exceptional nature of the event disguised a reversal of earlier trends that was already under 
way at the end of the 1980’s, indicating the declining importance of migratory flows on Israeli 
demographic processes. 
For a few years now, experts in this sector seem to agree that the great migratory waves 
towards Israel have ended. The most credible estimates quantify the possible migratory 
reserve towards Israel, in the course of the next ten or fifteen years, at between one and two 
million individuals (Shafir Y. and Peled Y., 1998, pp. 51-73). For these reasons, one of the 
principal objectives of the government in Jerusalem, beyond trying to render Israel an 
                                                 
8  In April 2004, for example, the Australian government arrested and then expelled two Israeli spies, 
demanding apologies from Israel, for trafficking in false documents. 
9  Effecting a census of the Jewish population around the world is no easy task, given the lack of 
homogeneous data available, the incomplete nature of various statistics, the speculation practiced by 
several communities, conversions and nuances inherent in the concept of Jewishness. It is possible 
however to obtain at least a general idea of the proportions.  According to data from Central Bureau of 
Statistic in 2001, the Jewish population around the world was estimated prudently at around 13,450,000 
individuals. Of these around 36% were concentrated formally in Israel and 42% in the United States. At 
least two other countries, Russia and France, count communities slightly over 500,000. Argentina, Great 
Britain, Canada and Ukraine have a population between 250,000 and a half million individuals. The 
Jewish community of the United States is probably the most studied, and is indicative of the recurring 
difficulties in defining Jewishness even if the data is readily available. Of the over five million Jewish 
Americans for example, more than a half million declare they do not identify themselves in the Jewish 
religion. Moreover, marriages to non-Jews in the United States have increased progressively in recent 
decades, and precisely from 9% in 1965 to 52% in 1990, posing further problems of identity for new 
generations. On this topic see the American CBS (Central Bureau of Statistics), Selected Statistical 
Abstracts. 
10  We should remember that during the 1970’s there had already been a migratory flow from the Soviet 
Union of about 200,000 persons.  Data estimating this migration from the former Soviet Union at around 
750,000 is correct, as it takes into account departures before 1989.  Finally, according to some estimates, 
a number between 30 and 40% of these migrants are not of Jewish origin, a statistic confirmed by the 
significant increase in the Christian community that took place in those years.  On this topic see the 
Foreign Ministry of Information Service, 1998. 
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attractive destination for the diaspora, remains that of reducing the outward flow of 
individuals. 
The general picture does not seem however to confirm these expectations.  The weight of 
migratory flows on the growth of the Israeli population has decreased constantly over the last 
fifty years, and the tendency becomes even more evident if we consider only the migratory 
phenomenon of the Jewish component. If this evolution is comprehensible with the passing of 
momentary conditions, linked to the noted wartime events, one piece of data stands out, 
referring to the period between 2001 and 2003, which registered a decline in net migratory 
flows of 77% compared to the preceding three-year period. 
It should be noted also that not all the migrants counted as moving to Israel are Jewish11. A 
few of these are in fact simply workers coming from underdeveloped countries that emigrate 
with a work permit, including a small percentage of Palestinians12. While observing the 
general flows, as indicated in Tab. n. 4 and n. 5, we note that Israel loses it attractiveness even 
for citizens arriving from developing countries that have traditionally performed the most 
thankless tasks. The total statistic for 2002, compared with that of 1999 indicates a drop of 
more than 25% of those entering Israel with a proper work permit, also reflecting a slight 
ageing of the immigrant population. 
Asian labour which, together with the Philippinos, the Thai and the Chinese, represent the 
largest number of these, are the ones experiencing the most evident decreases, down by 42%. 
Statistics from Europe reached a peak in 2001, thanks to workers arriving from East European 
countries, especially Romanians and Bulgarians, which however dropped in 2002 by over 
60% compared to 1999. The Israeli government has tried to target that part of the population 
which has been considered mostly likely to emigrate13.  
The outward flows from Israel have traditionally been directed towards the United States, 
Great Britain, and to a lesser extent, the other countries of northern Europe.  Generally, they 
are young persons in their twenties, who usually have completed their military service and 
have experienced difficulties in securing independent adequate housing or in supporting 
themselves while pursuing their studies in institutions of higher learning. 
The other important category is made up of professionals and technicians that find more 
rapid career advancement in larger countries. The problem, as might be guessed, is not a 
minor one, and has led the Ministers of Defence, Labour and Welfare, Education and Culture, 
and Finance to create special spending categories to stop the potential “brain drain” since the 
end of the 1980’s14. 
                                                 
11  It should also be stressed that many of the potential immigrants, especially those arriving from the 
former Soviet republics, prefer to choose other destinations, such as Germany, which in 2003 absorbed 
19,000 Jews, as compared to 12,000 to Israel.  Official notice of this phenomenon provoked criticism 
from the Chairman of the Jewish Agency, Sallai Meridor, who invited the Israeli government to “… take 
serious steps to counter Germany since this situation drastically affects immigration to Israel…” On this 
topic see Hazan, 5/21/2004, p. 7. 
12  It is difficult to count the real number of Palestinians arriving from the Territories that have a job in 
Israel, given that many are without contract, and the employment relationship is subject to periodic 
interruptions coinciding with the closure of the borders and the increase in attacks.  All together, about 
600,000 are illegal foreigners that remain in Israel.  Even if without documents, these have often lived in 
Israel for years, have families and children that attend Israeli schools; a solution should be found also for 
them. On this topic see Friedberg, 2001. 
13  Their preference for the United States has been true for decades.  At the beginning of the 1980’s, 
applications by Israeli citizens to convert their temporary visa to a work or study visa were already the 
most numerous among western countries. On this topic see The Statistical Yearbook of the United States, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1982-85.  
14  Among the most well-known initiatives, we remember the agreement of 1998, with major Jewish 
donors from North America and the Council of Jewish Federations to finance with $300 million the 
“Birthright Israel” programme, which sponsors any Jew in the world, between 15 and 26 years of age, to 
visit Israel. The creation of the Center fo Submicron Semiconductor Science as part of the Weizmann 
Institute has also been important, achieved at the beginning of the 1990’s, created not only to stimulate 
the local high-tech industry, but also to bring Israeli emigrants back home and induce young graduates 
not to leave. 
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Tab. n. 4. Immigrants (1) and potential immigrants by type of permit.  
IMMIGRANTS ACCORDIG TO LAW OF RETURN 
Year Grand Total Total 
Entered with an 
immigrant or potential 
immigrant visa 
Changed status from 
tourist to immigrant or 
potential immigrant 
Immigrants (2) 
accordino to 
Law of entry 
1996 70.919 69.831 59.748 10.083 1.088 
1997 66.221 64.725 55.135 .590 1.496 
1998 56.727 53.547 47.487 6.060 3.180 
1999 76.766 74.498 68.338 6.160 2.268 
2000 60.192 57.547 53.424 4.441 2.327 
2001 43.580 40.950 36.949 4.001 2.630 
2002 33.565 31.026 28.077 2.949 2539 
2003 23.226 22.637 20.313 2.324 589 
% change -31 -27 28 21 -77 
1. Excluding immigrating citizens (born abroad to Israeli citizens and came to Israel to settle). 
2. Including a small number of tourists who changed their status to immigrants. 
3. Immigrants who received a permit for a permanent stay. 
Source: Monthly Bulletin of Statistics e Migration and Tourism. Tab. E/2. 
 
Graphic n. 1. Imigrants by year of imigration and last continent of residence, 1991-2003. 
1. The population indicated as “America Europe” includes Latin America and European countries former 
ex Soviet Union included Russia.  
Source: Central Bureau Statistic of Israel, Selected Data Imigration, Tab. 4.2. 
 
Departures from Israel between 1998 and 2001 registered increases of 28%. The age group 
between 20 and 39 years of age was the most mobile, representing over 43% of the outward 
flows. Between 1999 and 2001, the number of relative to the younger, productive generation, 
after taking into account returns, increased by 7.1%. In the same period, the rate of net 
migration for subjects under 20 years of age increased by 8.5%, a symptom confirming the 
choice of a probable transfer abroad on the part of entire family units.  
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Tab. n. 5. Arrivals of work permit holders, by year of arrival, country of citeznship, thousands. 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Total 53,3 52,2 78,2 33,2 
Asia 25,6 23,0 39,1 22,9 
India 0,7 0,7 0,6 0,5 
Turkey  2,2 1,8 4,9 
0,6     
Lebanon 3,2 0,9 11,8 1,8 
China 2,6 2,9 8,9 7,4 
Philippines 7,2 7,6 11,7 12,1 
Tahiland 8,4 8,0 1,2 0,5 
Other Countries (1) 1,3 1,0 0,5 0,5 
Africa 0,5 0,6 4,5 0,3 
Europe 24,0 26,7 33,9 9,4 
Bulgaria  2,0 2,3 5,9 
1,1     
Ussr (former) (2) 3,3 4,3 0,3 2,1 
Germany 0,7 0,4 0,5 0,2 
United Kingdom 0,9 0,6 2,1 0,3 
Romania 13,8 16,6 23,7 4,5 
Other Countries 3,4 2,4 1,4 1,2 
America-Oceania 2,9 1,7 0,8 0,6 
Usa 2,1 1,1 0,6 0,4 
Other Countries 0,9 0,6 0,3 0,2 
Not know 0,2 0,1 0,1 -- 
1. Included Asian Republics of the Ussr (former).  
2. Include Europeaan Repubblics only. 
Source: Central Bureau Statistic of Israel, Selected Data Imigration, Tab. 4.10. 
 
The growth in the imbalance between outward and inward flows regards, in any case, all 
the age categories of the Israeli population, especially those persons over sixty years of age, 
whose net increase between 1999 and 2001 was actually 22%.  
The ambivalent status of diaspora Jews and Jewish organisations has evolved substantially 
since the formation of the Israeli state fifty years ago, and may be interpreted more as a 
function of the Israeli state, responding to globalisation and other democratic pressures rather 
than the effects of globalisation itself. 
Even though a positive spiral opened up at the first stage of the Peace Process, with the 
consequent cancelling of the boycott of Israeli goods by many Arab governments and the 
gradual flow of foreign capital to Israeli reversed this tendency, its effects petered out in a 
short time15. The reasons behind this situation were many, linked principally to the 
deterioration of negotiations, but not only. In general, a structural, economic and cultural crisis 
may be observed involving Israeli society and putting in doubt several of the original 
postulates of Zionism. 
Above all, the negative effects deriving from the perpetuation of a conflict situation must 
be considered.  After a four-year period of stability, the number of Israeli families living under 
the poverty line began to increase again after 2001, passing from 17.7% to 21.2% in 200416. 
This tendency was the result of successive budget cuts in those monies destined for assistance 
to the underprivileged, equal to 7.2% in the previous two years. The recent Intifada, in 2003, 
cost Israel between 6.2 and 8% of GDP, while the related decrease was more significant than 
                                                 
15  At the beginning of the 1990’s, Israel registered the highest level of economic growth among OECD 
countries, with an increase in GNP of 6.2% in 1991 and 6.7% in 1992.  Returns to Israel from the United 
States saw a maximum increase of 14,000 individuals in 1995. On this topic, see Arian, 1988. 
16  This statistic refers to the month of May. On this topic see Sinai R., 5/11/2004. 
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in the previous year, between 0.7 an 1.8%, due to the subsequent calming of the security 
situation. This impoverishment and decrease in the purchasing power of Israeli families has 
provoked a chain reaction: between 2000 and 2003, foreign investment decreased by 70%, 
tourism by 65%, and unemployment has increased by 40% between 2002 and 2003 ( Bank of 
Israel data, www.al-awda.org,  6/13/2004). 
In the second place, several behavioural variables related to globalisation that have 
favoured the situation of those with dual citizenship, who usually alternated periods of study 
and work between the United States and Israel, must be considered. At the same time, the 
feeling among the younger generation that the aliyah is essential for the future of their country 
has become less pronounced, and as a consequence the stigma regarding those who decide to 
move has decreased17. Finally, it is significant to observe that as Israel has experienced rapid 
growth in economic strength, traditional support from the Jewish diaspora, particularly in the 
United States, has declined. This is the result of a shift in priorities that have coincided with 
the passing of the older generation of the Jewish American community leaders whose 
formative years were spent during the Holocaust and the establishment of the state of Israel, in 
contrast to younger leaders, for whom Israel is a fact of life18. 
3. Conclusions 
The anticipated emergence of a Palestinian Arab majority in the lands between the Jordan 
River and the Mediterranean Sea, coupled with the sense that the Palestinian mainstream still 
seeks somehow to deny Israel’s legitimacy, and eventually to “Palestinise” the country, have 
obliged Israelis to contemplate unilateral withdrawal to lines that improve the country’s 
demographic status as a Jewish state.  This is the most evident development in Israeli politics.  
These demographic issues have a nationalist and political background, but there is an 
economic theme as well: an overlay to the Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli conflicts that is 
essentially classic between north and south in nature.  Currently, there are some 100,000 
Palestinians from the West Bank, Gaza and even Jordan, as well as an estimated 10,000 or so 
Egyptians inside Israel’s internationally-recognised borders. The vast majority of these illegal 
immigrants were motivated to move to Israel by economic rather than ideological reasons. 
One of the Palestinian complaints about Israel’s security fence project is that it will stop 
the free movement of this illegal labour, hence depriving more Palestinians of their livelihood.  
While the fence is being constructed mainly for security reasons, and its many abuses and 
departures from the green line can still be linked to geographic motivations concerning the 
settlements, its demographic significance is not lost on Israeli strategic planners. If Israel’s 
relative prosperity currently attracts illegal migrants despite conditions of conflict, a 
hypothetical, positive peace situation would have a problematic, demographic downside.  This 
is particularly so when we assume that most of the migrant labourers from the neighbouring 
“south” would be Palestinians who end up remaining in the country. 
This explains at least one aspect of the constant tension in Israel’s economy over the past 
decade, between the importation of agricultural and construction workers from Palestine on 
one hand, and from countries like Thailand, China and Romania.  Yet when Prime Minister 
Sharon indicates, in the course of planning the withdrawal from Gaza, that he eventually 
hopes to cease all movement of both labourers and goods between Israel and that territory, his 
rationale is not just security. It is also the recognition that “northern” Israel is sitting next to a 
heavily-overpopulated and under-developed “southern” time bomb in areas like the Gaza 
Strip. 
                                                 
17  From an investigation conducted by the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption in 1996, it became clear 
that only 65% of the young people interviewed agreed with the necessity of the Aliyah for the future of 
Israel.  The same statistic referring to 1992 was 71%, and 90% in 1979. Ministry of Immigrant 
Absorption, 1998, p. 57 and others. 
18  On this topic see Arian, 1998, pp. 67 and others. 
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